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League-Table Incentives and Price Bubbles 
in Experimental Asset Markets
* 
 
We study experimental markets in which participants face incentives modeled upon those 
prevailing in markets for managed funds. Each participant’s portfolio is periodically evaluated 
at market value and ranked in a league table according to short-term paper returns. Those 
who rank highly attract a larger share of new fund inflows. Under conditions in which prices 
are close to intrinsic value, the effect of incentives is mild. However under conditions in which 
markets are prone to bubble, mispricing is greatly exacerbated by incentives. Even in 
experienced markets, prices climb to levels clearly indicative of speculation and do not 
always crash back. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  global  financial  crisis  of  2008,  the  compensation  and  incentive 
structures of participants in financial markets have come under intense scrutiny in regulatory 
and  policy  circles.  Of  particular  interest  in  these  discussions  is  the  question  of  whether 
market participants face incentives that may induce them to behave in a manner that might 
contribute to the distortion or instability of markets. One specific channel through which this 
may  occur  has  been  canvassed  in  recent  research  on  managed  funds.  According  to  this 
argument, “returns chasing” retail investors respond to rankings information on the relative 
performance of competing funds. As a result, funds that rank highly in the “league table” 
attract the lion’s share of new fund inflows. Since fund managers are typically remunerated 
as  a  function  of  funds  under  management,  their  incentives  will  thus  have  tournament 
characteristics.  Thus  they  may  be  tempted  to  pursue  short run  strategies  directed  toward 
improving a fund’s position in the league table, potentially to the detriment of the long run 
interests of existing investors (Brown, Harlow and Starks 1996, Chevalier and Ellison 1997). 
Well known  examples  of  agencies  that  compile  rankings  of  the  relative  performance  of 
mutual funds include Morningstar, Inc. and Lipper, Inc. Such rankings information is readily 
accessible to retail investors through a very wide variety of media and online outlets. The 
empirical relationship between a fund’s recent performance and new inflows into that fund 
has been extensively documented in numerous studies.
1 Of course, whether returns chasing 
behavior is rational for investors depends upon the degree to which there is persistence in 
fund performance over time. While this is itself an empirical question, the dissemination of 
performance information is typically accompanied by the disclaimer that past returns are not 
necessarily indicative of future returns. Finally, the extent to which funds are observed to 
distort their risk profile in response to league table incentives in field data has also been the 
subject of a lively empirical debate.
2 
While this literature has been concerned with the effect of relative performance rankings on 
the strategies of individual funds, it is silent on the question of the aggregate implications of 
league table incentives for the performance of the market as a whole. Further, it is important 
                                                 
1   See, for example, Ippolito (1992), Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1994), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), 
Sirri and Tufano (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Ivković and Weisbenner (2009). Del Guercio 
and Tkac (2008) provide direct evidence on the effect of Morningstar ratings. 
2   See,  for  example,  Brown,  Harlow  and  Starks  (1996),  Chevalier  and  Ellison  (1997), Koski  and  Pontiff 
(1999), Busse (2001), Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005), Chen and Pennachi (2009). 3 
to stress that the relative performance that drives fund inflow is necessarily assessed on the 
basis of paper returns evaluated at market prices. These market valuations need not coincide 
with a fund manager’s own judgment of the “true” intrinsic value of a fund’s assets.  
If market conditions are such that there are strong forces that work to keep prices close to 
intrinsic value, then there is little prospect that a fund can improve its relative performance 
other than by trading on “fundamentals” – in effect seeking to arbitrage price deviations from 
intrinsic value more successfully than its competitors. However when the market is in a 
bubble, this is no longer the case. Since it is performance evaluated at market prices that 
drives new fund inflows, a manager’s incentive to rank highly in terms of paper returns may 
overwhelm considerations of intrinsic value. A fund may then “ride the bubble” by betting 
that prices the manager considers to be overvalued will nonetheless continue to rise. It does 
this because the manager fears that if the fund sells out of the bubble prematurely it will lag 
the performance of its competitors in the short term, and thereby suffer reduced inflows. 
In this paper, we examine whether league table incentives may contribute to the perpetuation 
of price bubbles in asset markets. A bubble in asset prices has been defined as “trade in high 
volumes at prices that are considerably at variance from intrinsic value” (King et al 1993, p. 
183).  Such  an  event,  and  any  ensuing  crash  back  to  intrinsic  value,  can  have  adverse 
consequences for the efficient allocation of capital, as well as distorting the distribution of 
wealth and propagating instability throughout the economy. For these reasons, the factors that 
contribute to the severity of price bubbles are of interest to policy makers and regulators. 
Numerous historical episodes of extreme pricing behavior have been put forward as instances 
of bubbles – foremost among these are the Dutch “Tulipmania” of the seventeenth century 
and the pricing of technology stocks at the turn of the twenty first century. However, an 
inherent  difficulty  of  studying  price  bubbles  using  historical  data  is  that  an  asset’s  true 
intrinsic value is not observable even in retrospect. Thus any empirical assessment of a price 
bubble is necessarily contingent upon assumptions that must be made with regard to intrinsic 
value, leading to the possibility of specification error. As a result, there is always scope for 
disagreement over whether any given historical episode indeed constitutes a price bubble.
3 
                                                 
3   For a reappraisal of the Dutch “Tulipmania” see Thompson (2006). For the case of technology stocks see 
Pástor and Veronesi (2006). 4 
For the purpose of studying the effect of incentive structures upon price bubbles, a further 
challenge for empirical  research is that the incentives facing market participants may be 
endogenous  to  the  performance  of  the  market  under  consideration,  may  differ  between 
participants within a given market, and may in any case not be observable to the researcher. 
In this paper, we study empirically the effect of league table incentives upon the severity of 
price bubbles in asset markets, by comparing the performance of markets in which such 
incentives are present to ones in which they are absent. Our solution to the challenges raised 
in  the  preceding  paragraphs  is  to  make  this  comparison  in  the  context  of  a  laboratory 
experiment. In this setting, both the intrinsic value of the asset that is bought and sold and the 
incentives facing market participants are known and under the control of the researcher. This 
enables us to obtain a clean identification of the causal effect of the  incentive structure, 
holding all other aspects of the market environment constant. 
The specific parametric design of our experiments is based upon canonical studies by Smith, 
Suchanek and Williams (1988) and Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2001). The key features of 
this design include: an asset with a known and finite lifetime, periodic dividends that are 
independent draws from a known probability distribution, common knowledge of all payoff 
relevant  information,  and  repetition  of  the  entire  multi period  market.  We  adopt  this 
framework  because  it  is  a  proven  design  whose  properties  are  well known,  extensively 
replicated, and found to be robust to a variety of manipulations in an extensive body of 
previous  research.
4  Further,  there  also  exists  a  broadly accepted  set  of  measures  for 
evaluating the performance of markets of this type, enabling our results to be interpreted 
within the context of the existing literature. 
Each  experimental  market  consists  of  nine  traders  who  can  buy  and  sell  an  asset  in 
continuous time. Since individual transaction prices – as well as the behavior of individual 
participants within a given market – are likely to be interdependent in complex ways, we 
focus on the market itself as the unit of independent observation and conduct our analysis in 
terms of market level measures of performance. In other words, our primary focus is the 
effect of league table incentives upon the severity of price bubbles at a market level, as 
opposed to the intermediating effects of incentives upon individual behavior. 
                                                 
4   See, for example, King et al (1991), van Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1993), Porter and Smith (1995), 
Caginalp, Porter and Smith (2001), Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001), Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore 
(2005), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair (2007), and Hussam, Porter and Smith 
(2008). 5 
In our baseline experiments, each trader receives identical periodic bonuses irrespective of 
their performance. These bonuses model the inflow of new funds under management, and in 
the baseline they do not vary as a function of relative performance. Thus under the baseline, a 
trader’s earnings depend only upon the intrinsic value of their holdings at the conclusion of 
the market. In our tournament condition, we introduce league table incentives by allocating 
bonuses on the basis of each trader’s relative performance, as measured by the recent growth 
in the paper value of their portfolio. Once again, final earnings are assessed at intrinsic value; 
however the measure of return that is used to construct the league table is based upon market 
price. In this manner, we induce a tension between the pursuit of long run and short run 
measures of value under the tournament. 
In addition to this primary treatment dimension, we also consider the effect of experience in 
repeated markets, and of varying the parameterization of intrinsic value. We do this because 
the standard design of an experimental asset market, in which intrinsic value declines over 
time,  has  been  observed  to  bubble  even  in  the  absence  of  league table  incentives.  Such 
bubbles, however, are also known to robustly diminish with experience. By studying repeated 
markets, we can examine whether the effect of league table incentives is powerful enough to 
counteract the tendency for prices to track more closely to intrinsic value with experience. By 
also studying an alternative environment in which intrinsic value is constant over time, which 
is known to be less bubble prone, we can examine whether the effect of incentives is milder 
under conditions in which the tension between market and intrinsic value is less pronounced. 
Our results are consistent with both of these conjectures. 
In  the  standard  (declining value)  environment  with  baseline  incentives,  we  replicate  the 
results of previous studies: we observe a tendency for prices to deviate above intrinsic value, 
but this moderates with experience in repeated markets. As discussed above, we expect the 
effect of league table incentives to be more pronounced in an environment in which market 
and intrinsic values deviate persistently from one another. Consistent with this, we find that 
price deviations above intrinsic value are significantly larger under league table incentives 
than in the baseline. Moreover, under league table incentives, the magnitude of price bubbles 
is significantly exacerbated with experience. This contrasts with previous findings on the 
effect  of  experience  upon  mispricing  in  experimental  asset  markets,  and  confirms  the 
potential for league table incentives to amplify price distortions in these markets. 6 
In the constant value environment with baseline incentives, we again observe that prices 
deviate  somewhat  above  intrinsic  value  in  inexperienced  markets.  However,  and  again 
consistent with previous research, these deviations are mild compared to what we observe in 
the declining value environment. Moreover, in experienced markets with baseline incentives, 
prices track intrinsic value almost perfectly.
5 Accordingly, we expect the effect of league 
table incentives to be less pronounced in this environment: since the tension between market 
and intrinsic values is less severe, there is less scope for a trader to improve their relative 
position by deviating from the pursuit of intrinsic value. We find that prices are nonetheless 
significantly higher under league table compared to baseline incentives and, moreover, that 
the difference persists with experience. However, the effect of incentives is much milder than 
in the declining value environment, manifesting itself in the form of sustained overpricing by 
a factor of around five percent relative to intrinsic value. 
RELATED LITERATURE 
We are aware of related experimental work by James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and James 
(2003). They study experimental asset markets in which above average performers are paid 
as a function of the extent to which they “beat the market”, while those who perform below 
average are simply paid a flat fee. This incentive structure is found to cause prices to diverge 
from  intrinsic  value.  James  and  Isaac  (2000)  provide  numerical  examples  of  how  their 
incentives can lead to rational trades at prices that depart from intrinsic value. However these 
examples are driven by the fact that under their incentives, the earnings of a trader who 
underperforms the market are completely unhinged from the intrinsic value of that trader’s 
holdings. This explains why a trader who trails the market as the reporting date approaches 
could be indifferent to “throwing away” money on a bid that exceeds intrinsic value.  
In the James and Isaac tournament, a trader’s incentive payment is determined solely by their 
final position at the conclusion of fifteen trading periods. As a result, a trader who makes 
poor decisions early in the experiment may find themself so far out of the reckoning as to 
simply “give up” and resign themself to receiving the flat fee. We conjecture that this may 
account for the “frustration trades” noted by James and Isaac (2000, p. 1002). 
                                                 
5   We provide what we believe are the first reported results for repeated markets with constant intrinsic value. 
Our finding that (under baseline incentives) prices in this environment track intrinsic value more or less 
perfectly in experienced markets is of independent interest for the literature on experimental asset markets. 7 
The design of our tournament condition addresses each of these concerns. Firstly, to ensure 
that earnings are ultimately aligned with long run intrinsic value, we follow standard practice 
in the literature by paying out the final value of each trader’s cash balance after all dividends 
have  been  realized.  Secondly,  to  avert  the  possibility  that  some  traders  might  become 
discouraged from competing over tournament incentives, we offer four equal sized bonuses, 
at evenly timed intervals over the life of the market. We design these bonuses such that no 
trader is ever out of contention for a bonus in the current “market year” on account of poor 
performance in previous years. Finally, we also note that our analysis of incentive effects is 
based  upon  a  between groups  comparison,  whereas  James  and  Isaac  report  within group 
comparisons that may be confounded by experience and treatment order. 
We are also aware of related work by Robin, Strážnická and Villeval (2010). Their design is 
concerned with the frequency with which bonuses are paid to the top performers in a market. 
In their long term bonus treatment, similar to James and Isaac, bonuses are paid only once – 
upon conclusion of fifteen periods of trade. In the short term bonus treatment, bonuses are 
awarded after every trading period. In both treatments, bonuses are awarded to the top three 
performers out of a total of eight traders in each market. 
In the long term bonus condition, each trader’s performance is evaluated on the basis of the 
overall change in their cash position over the life of the market. By contrast, in the short term 
bonus condition, performance is assessed according to the change in the paper value of a 
trader’s portfolio over the preceding period. Thus in the long term condition, a trader’s final 
share holdings at the end of the experiment are correctly ascribed their terminal intrinsic 
value of zero. On the other hand, in the short term condition, a trader’s share holdings at the 
end of each period are valued at market prices (using the average transaction price in the 
period just concluded). 
We conjecture that this difference between the two conditions in how shares are valued in the 
assessment  of  performance  may  have  a  considerable  bearing  upon  the  results.  Robin, 
Strážnická  and  Villeval  find  that  relative  to  a  baseline  condition  in  which  there  are  no 
bonuses, market prices are less distorted under long term bonuses, whereas prices are more 
distorted  under  short term  bonuses.  We  interpret  their  result  to  be  consistent  with  our 
intuition that the effect of incentives will be distortionary specifically when the incentives 
induce a tension between the pursuit of market and intrinsic values. However, the magnitude 
of the effects they report are modest, and they do not consider the effect of experience. By 8 
contrast, our central finding concerns the interaction of incentives with experience, as we 
show that the effect of incentives upon mispricing is exacerbated with experience. 
DESIGN 
Overview 
Our experimental design has three dimensions. Our primary objective is to identify the effect 
upon market performance of a league table incentive regime in which market participants 
compete over new fund inflows that accrue as a function of their past relative performance 
ranking, and where performance is assessed on the basis of paper returns. To this end, we 
compare  a  baseline  condition,  in  which  new  inflows  accrue  uniformly  irrespective  of 
performance, to a tournament condition in which they depend upon relative returns, in a 
manner that will be made precise below. 
In addition to this primary treatment manipulation, we examine the robustness of incentive 
effects with respect to two additional dimensions. Firstly, we examine how the effect of the 
incentive structure interacts with market experience, by completing two repetitions of the 
market in each session. Secondly, we implement two alternative parameterizations of the 
dividend process that gives rise to the intrinsic value of the experimental asset. We refer to 
this latter dimension hereinafter as the “market environment”. Our analyses of the effect of 
the incentive condition and market environment are based upon between group comparisons, 
while we identify the effect of experience in a within group comparison. 
Parameters common to all treatments 
We begin by documenting those features of the design that are common across all sessions of 
our study. Our unit of observation is a market, with each market composed of nine traders. 
Each repetition of a market operates for sixteen trading periods. At the start of the first period 
each trader is given an initial endowment of experimental money and shares. All nine traders 
receive the exact same endowments, and thus have identical ex ante earnings opportunities. 
In each trading period, the market opens for three minutes during which traders can buy and 
sell shares in exchange for money in a computerized continuous double auction market. At 
the end of each period, each share pays a stochastic dividend to its current owner. This 
dividend is the same for all shares in the market in any given period, and is added to the 9 
owner’s money balance at the end of the period.
6 A trader’s holdings of money and shares 
carry over from one trading period to the next within a given market repetition.  
In  every  treatment,  the  instructions  include  an  “average  holding  value  table”  which 
summarizes, for each of the sixteen periods, the sum of the expected dividends that a trader 
would receive on average from each share if it were held from the current period through 
until the end of the sixteenth period. Since this information is provided to all traders in the 
market, the intrinsic value of shares is common knowledge throughout the entire experiment. 
We frame a single trading period as a “market quarter” and a set of four consecutive trading 
periods as a “market year”. Each sixteen period market repetition thus constitutes four market 
years. At the conclusion of the first (“inexperienced”) market repetition, all money and share 
balances are reinitialized to their starting values, and a second (“experienced”) repetition is 
conducted. Participants are paid for their decisions in both repetitions, according to their 
closing money balance after the final dividend has accrued.
7 This amount is converted into 
cash at a fixed and pre announced exchange rate and paid at the conclusion of the session. 
The Smith and Noussair market environments 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  ours  is  the  first  study  in  the  extensive  literature  on 
experimental  asset  markets  to  examine  the  effect  of  a  given  treatment  condition  –  here, 
league table  incentives  –  across  two  distinct  market  environments.  We  consider  this  an 
important feature of our design, and comment further on our rationale for so doing below. 
The first environment, in which intrinsic value declines over the life of the asset, is due to 
Smith,  Suchanek  and  Williams  (1988),  hereinafter  SSW,  and  we  refer  to  it  as  a  “Smith 
market”.  This  constitutes  the  canonical  design  for  virtually  all  subsequent  experimental 
research on asset markets – including the related studies of incentives by James and Isaac 
(2000), Isaac and James (2003) and Robin, Strážnická and Villeval (2010). Accordingly, we 
consider this to be the primary setting in which we examine the effect of incentives.  
                                                 
6  As explained below, in a “Noussair” market it is possible for the dividend to be negative. In this case, it is 
framed as a “holding cost”, and subtracted from the owner’s money balance at the end of the period. 
7   In the case of the “Noussair” market environment, this is also after all shares have paid out their final 
redemption value, as will be explained below. 10 
However, notwithstanding its benchmark status in the literature, the Smith design has not 
been entirely free from criticism.
8 Chief among its idiosyncrasies are the fact that the intrinsic 
value of shares declines over time and, relatedly, that the ratio of the volume of cash to the 
intrinsic  value  of  stock  increases  over  the  life  of  the  market.  Both  of  these  features  are 
thought to contribute to the most striking feature of the Smith design, namely its tendency to 
generate price bubbles and crashes in markets in which participants are inexperienced. 
For our purpose of studying the potential  for incentives to distort market outcomes, this 
tendency of Smith markets to bubble is a double edged sword. On the one hand, it creates 
conditions in which there is tension between market and intrinsic values, which we conjecture 
to be a prerequisite for league table effects. On the other hand, it obliges us to disentangle the 
marginal distortion due to incentives from that which is inherent in the design of the market. 
It is for this reason that we introduce experience as a second dimension of our design.  
Just as inexperienced Smith markets are known to bubble and crash, it is equally well known 
that this tendency is attenuated with experience.
9 Thus by collecting both inexperienced and 
experienced observations on each of our markets we are able, firstly, to examine whether the 
effect of league table incentives is itself either attenuated or exacerbated by experience, and 
secondly, to compare market performance under these incentives to a baseline in which the 
tendency of the environment to bubble has been moderated by experience. In effect, then, we 
identify incentive effects in Smith markets through their interaction with experience. 
In light of these complications, we perform an additional robustness check by also examining 
the effect of our incentive structure in an alternative market environment due to Noussair, 
Robin and Ruffieux (2001), which we refer to hereinafter as a “Noussair market”. In this 
design, the intrinsic value of shares remains constant over time, as does, on average, the ratio 
of cash to the intrinsic value of stock. As a result, this market has been found to be less prone 
to  bubble  and  crash,  although  it  is  not  considered  entirely  bubble free.  Accordingly,  the 
conflict between market and intrinsic values is less pronounced in this environment, and we 
expect the distorting effects of league table incentives to be less severe. 
                                                 
8   See, for example, Kirchler, Huber and Stöckl (2009). 
9   See SSW (1988), van Boening, Williams and LaMaster (1993), Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore (2005). 11 
Smith market parameters 
To accommodate our framing in terms of market quarters and years, we extend the life of the 
experimental asset from fifteen periods in SSW to sixteen. Following SSW, the dividend that 
is paid after each trading period takes values of 0, 8, 28 or 60 experimental currency units 
(ECU), each with equal probability, such that the expected dividend in each period is 24. At 
the end of the sixteenth period, all shares expire and have no further value. The intrinsic value 
of a share in any given period is thus 24 times the number of outstanding dividends. In 
particular, it is 384 in the first period, and declines by 24 after each dividend realization. 
Whereas the traders in SSW’s markets have heterogeneous initial endowments, we instead 
give all traders the same endowment, consisting of 2,496 ECU and eight shares. We do this to 
eliminate any possibility that the cash and share composition of a trader’s initial endowment 
might influence their position in our tournament condition.
10, 11 In fixing the cash component 
of this endowment, we take care to ensure that the ratio of cash to the intrinsic value of stock 
is the same in the first period of our design as the corresponding value in SSW,
12 so as to 
facilitate comparison of our results with other research on markets of this type. This ratio 
increases over the life of a Smith market, as new dividend flows inject more cash into the 
market at the same time as the intrinsic value of shares declines. 
Noussair market parameters 
In the Noussair environment the intrinsic value of a share remains constant in every period. 
This is achieved by specifying the dividend process in such a way that the expected dividend 
in each period is equal to zero. In particular, the dividend takes values of −24, −16, 4 or 36, 
each with equal probability, where these represent the corresponding values in the Smith 
design shifted downward by their expected value of 24. Negative dividends are framed as 
“holding costs”. So as to bestow shares with a positive intrinsic value, each share also pays a 
final redemption value of 400 after the end of the sixteenth period. The intrinsic value of a 
share is thus constant and equal to 400 in every period. 
                                                 
10   With heterogeneous endowments, a trader who is initially endowed with more shares and less cash could, 
for example, rank more highly in the league table simply as a result of favorable dividend realizations. 
11   King et al (1993) find that giving all traders equal initial endowments does not affect the tendency for Smith 
markets to bubble and crash. 
12   That  is,  2,496 / (384×8) = 0.8125.  For  the  median  trader  in  SSW,  the  corresponding  calculation  is 
585 / (360×2) = 0.8125. 12 
Because the expected dividend inflow to the market is zero in every period, the ratio of cash 
to the intrinsic value of stock is on average constant over the life of a Noussair market.
13 We 
set the initial ratio to 2:1 to make it comparable to the middle periods of a Smith market.
14 
Thus we endow each trader in our Noussair markets with 6,400 ECU and eight shares. 
The baseline and tournament incentive conditions 
Our primary treatment  manipulation is a tournament condition in which: 1) the value of 
traders’ portfolios are periodically evaluated at market prices, 2) traders are ranked at the end 
of each market year (four trading periods) on the basis of the year on year growth in the 
paper value of their portfolios, and 3) at the end of each year each trader receives an inflow of 
new money and shares, the size of which depends upon their rank over the past year. We 
compare this to a baseline condition in which the first two features are absent, and all traders 
receive the same new inflow irrespective of their past performance. 
Baseline incentive parameters 
In our baseline sessions, every trader receives the same inflow of new money and shares at 
the end of each market year. Valued at intrinsic value, the size of each inflow is equivalent to 
one quarter of the initial endowment. Since there are four such inflows, the total value of 
money and shares under management thus doubles over the sixteen period life of the market. 
The reason why we infuse new shares as well as money is to avoid distorting the ratio of cash 
to stock that would otherwise prevail in the market in the absence of any inflows. If we were 
to infuse new money alone, this could have an inflationary effect upon the share price for 
reasons  of  excess  liquidity  alone  (see  Caginalp,  Porter  and  Smith  2001).  This  would 
exacerbate any inherent tendency for the market to bubble, as well as confounding the effect 
of the incentive structure with that of excess liquidity. 
In a Noussair market, both the intrinsic value and the ratio of cash to stock remain constant 
over time, and so the new inflow that each trader receives in the baseline condition is simply 
1,600 ECU plus two shares at the end of each year. In a Smith market, in which the intrinsic 
                                                 
13   This is only true on average because the actual value depends upon the realized dividends and holding 
costs. 
14   In period seven of a standard fifteen period SSW market, the corresponding ratio is on average 2.0208. 13 
value of a share declines over time, each inflow consists of two shares plus an amount of cash 
that increases in each successive year.  
To see why this is the case, notice firstly that one quarter of our Smith endowment is 624 
ECU and two shares. By the end of the first year, however, each share has already paid out 
four dividends. To bring the value of the first inflow back up to one quarter of the initial 
endowment, it is thus necessary to add back the expected dividends that would have accrued 
on the two shares (24×4×2 = 192 ECU) had they been held since the start of the market. Thus 
each trader receives two shares and 816 ECU at the end of the first year, with the cash 
component increasing to 1,008, 1,200 and 1,392 ECU at the end of each successive year.
15 
Tournament incentive parameters 
In our tournament condition, the paper value of each trader’s holdings of money and shares is 
computed at the end of each market year. We assess the paper value of shares using the 
median transaction price over the previous quarter, where the median price is chosen because 
it is more difficult to manipulate than other measures of value such as the mean or closing 
price. Each trader is then ranked from one to nine on the basis of the year on year growth in 
the paper value of their portfolio.
16 The reason we evaluate returns on a year on year basis is 
to ensure that no trader is ever out of contention to attain a high rank in the current year on 
account of poor decisions that may have been made in previous years. 
At the end of each year, we allocate new inflows on the basis of a trader’s rank over the past 
year. The three top ranked traders receive new money and shares amounting to double what 
they would have received in the corresponding baseline condition. The three middle ranked 
traders receive the same new inflow as under the baseline, while the three bottom ranked 
traders receive nothing. As a result, the aggregate infusion of new money and shares into the 
market as a whole is the same at the end of each year as in the corresponding baseline. 
                                                 
15   Since the extra cash simply compensates for the dividends that would have been paid had the shares been in 
circulation since the beginning of the market, this procedure has the property that the aggregate ratio of cash 
to the intrinsic value of stock is identical to that which would have prevailed in the absence of any infusion. 
16   In the first market year, we assess the initial value at intrinsic value. Note however that this has no effect 
upon the outcome of the ranking, since all traders start out with an identical endowment. 14 
Details of sessions 
We completed our experiments between August 2009 and May 2010 in the experimental 
economics laboratory of an Australian research university. We over recruited participants to 
each session to ensure that there would be exactly nine traders in every market. In some 
sessions we conducted two simultaneous but independent markets on separate sides of the 
lab, with the instructions explaining clearly that there would only be nine traders in each of 
the markets.
17 All participants were currently enrolled students of the university, and none 
had ever participated in any previous asset market experiment. We managed the recruitment 
of participants using ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and the experiment was programmed in z Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). 
We conducted a total of six markets in each of the Smith baseline and Smith tournament 
conditions, and four markets in each of the Noussair baseline and tournament conditions. 
Each market yields one inexperienced observation and one experienced observation. Each 
session ran for approximately 2.5 hours in duration, and the average payment was AUD 46 
(approximately USD 39 at the time of the experiments). Table 1 summarizes our design. 
 [Table 1 about here.] 
RESULTS 
We derive our primary results in the Smith environment. In this setting, we find that market 
prices deviate significantly further from intrinsic value under league table incentives than in 
the baseline, and this is especially the case in experienced markets. In particular, in our Smith 
baseline  markets  we  find  that  prices  track  significantly  closer  to  intrinsic  value  with 
experience, whereas in Smith tournament markets experience has the opposite effect. Further, 
the effects of incentives are also observed in the Noussair environment. We find that with 
experience, baseline Noussair markets price at intrinsic value with near perfect accuracy, 
whereas in the tournament condition there is persistent mispricing even with experience. 
In support of these findings, we analyze period wise differences in median transaction prices 
across the different dimensions of our design. We also report a range of standard summary 
measures of market performance from the literature on experimental asset markets. Before 
reporting our analysis, we first define these measures. 
                                                 
17   See Appendix 1, which contains the full text of the instructions for the Smith tournament treatment. 15 
Bubble measures 
We follow the experimental literature in computing a range of so called “bubble measures”. 
Since  these  measures  normalize  for  differences  in  parameterization,  they  facilitate  the 
comparison of effects not only across the various dimensions of our design, but also against 
the broader literature on markets of this type. For those measures that are defined in terms of 
period wise aggregates of the price, we use the median transaction price as our summary 
measure of the price in each period. The measures that we consider are defined below. 
Amplitude is a measure of the overall peak to trough deviation in period wise transaction 
prices from intrinsic value. As defined by Haruvy and Noussair (2006), the maximum and 
minimum deviations are evaluated relative to contemporaneous intrinsic value, such that: 
( ) ( ) max / min / t t t t t t t t Amplitude P f f P f f = − − −          
where Pt is the (median) transaction price in period t and ft is intrinsic value in period t. A 
large value of this measure indicates large price swings relative to intrinsic value. 
Duration (Porter and Smith 1995) is the length of the longest consecutive sequence of periods 
over which the deviation of price from intrinsic value increases from one period to the next: 
( ) 1 1 max : t t t t t m t m Duration m P f P f P f + + + + = − < − < < − …  
Turnover is a measure of the total volume of trade over the life of a market relative to the 
total number of shares on issue. As originally defined by King (1991), Turnover is given by: 
1
T
t t Turnover q TSU
= =∑  
where T is the number of trading periods, qt is the number of shares transacted in period t and 
TSU (“total stock of units”) is the total number of shares on issue. Since our design involves 
the periodic infusion of new shares, we need to adjust the above expression to correct for the 
number of shares on issue in any given period. Accordingly, we define Adjusted Turnover as: 
( ) 1
T
t t t Adjusted Turnover q TSU
= =∑  
where  TSUt  is  the  total  stock  of  units  in  period  t.  Clearly,  this  reduces  to  the  standard 
definition of Turnover for the case in which the total stock of units is the same in all periods. 16 
Average Bias (Haruvy and Noussair 2006) is a measure of the average strength and direction 




t t t Average Bias P f
T
= = − ∑  
Average Dispersion (Palan 2009) measures the average absolute deviation in price in each 
period from intrinsic value.
18 It differs from Average Bias in that it penalizes both positive 
and negative deviations, where these potentially cancel out in the expression for Average 
Bias. The Average Dispersion is defined as: 
1
1 T
t t t Average Dispersion P f
T
= = − ∑  
Normalized  Absolute  Price  Deviation  (King  et  al  1993)  measures  the  aggregate  absolute 
deviation of individual transaction prices from intrinsic value, normalized by the TSU: 
( ) 1 1 100
t T q
it t t i Deviation P f TSU
= = = − × ∑ ∑  
where Pit is the price of the i th share transacted in period t. This measure combines both 
volume and price information into a single measure that penalizes high turnover at prices that 
deviate substantially from intrinsic value.
19 In our design, it is again necessary to correct for 
the periodic infusion of new stock. Accordingly, we define Adjusted Deviation as: 
( ) { } 1 1 100
t T q
it t t t i Adjusted Deviation P f TSU
= = = − × ∑ ∑  
Once again, this clearly reduces to the standard definition of Deviation for the case in which 
the total stock of units remains the same in every period. 
Finally, we introduce a new measure of the variation in earnings between traders in a market. 
We define the Normalized Earnings Variation as the standard deviation of traders’ earnings 
in a given market (expressed in units of experimental currency) normalized by the ex ante 
expected earnings of each trader. In our design, these expected earnings are simply the sum 
                                                 
18   A measure of Total Dispersion was introduced by Haruvy and Noussair (2006). We follow Palan (2009) in 
normalizing for the number of trading periods. 
19   The reason for dividing by 100 in the expression for Deviation is to make the results of our study, in which 
dividends are expressed as 0, 8, 28 or 60 experimental ‘cents’ comparable to earlier studies in which the 
dividends were expressed as 0.00, 0.08, 0.28 or 0.60 experimental ‘dollars’. 17 
of the intrinsic values of all initial endowments, plus the total infusions of cash and stock into 
the market, all averaged over the total number of traders in the market. 
In our design there are two distinct sources of earnings variation. Firstly, under both incentive 
conditions, some traders may execute more profitable transactions at the expense of others. 
Secondly,  under  our  league table  incentives,  the  end of year  bonuses  are  also  allocated 
unequally. If positions in the end of year rankings are uncorrelated from one year to the next, 
then this will not on average inflate the variation in earnings. On the other hand, if relative 
position is persistent over time then this will lead to larger values of the measure. We use this 
measure to examine both how the variability in earnings evolves with experience within a 
given incentive condition, as well as how it compares across the two incentive conditions. 
Results for Smith markets 
Figure 1 plots the time paths of median transaction prices in each trading period for each of 
our six Smith baseline markets. In this Figure, the left hand panel depicts the inexperienced 
market repetition while the right hand panel represents the experienced repetition. The lower 
stepped  line  represents  the  time  path  of  intrinsic  value,  while  the  upper  stepped  line 
represents the maximum holding value of a share, in the event that it pays the maximum 
possible dividend of 60 in each of the remaining periods. This maximum value is of interest 
since transactions at prices in excess of it can only be motivated either by speculation or 
irrationality (Lei et al 2001). Figure 2 shows the corresponding price paths for our six Smith 
tournament  markets.  This  has  been  drawn  to  a  different  scale  to  Figure  1  in  order  to 
accommodate the very high prices observed in two of the markets. Table 2 reports the bubble 
measures for each of our Smith markets, along with the averages of these measures for each 
treatment experience combination. 
[Figures 1 and 2 and Table 2 about here.] 
We organize our findings for the Smith environment into four results. We first show that, 
relative to the baseline, there is a small effect of league table incentives in inexperienced 
markets, and a much larger one in experienced markets. We then establish that this occurs 
both because prices track closer to intrinsic value with experience under the baseline, and 
because they deviate further from intrinsic value with experience under the tournament. 18 
Incentive effects in Smith markets 
RESULT  1:  In  inexperienced  Smith  markets,  the  Amplitude  and  Duration  are 
significantly greater under league table incentives. This occurs primarily because these 
markets typically do not crash back to intrinsic value in the final periods. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that prices typically exceed intrinsic value in inexperienced Smith 
markets under both baseline and tournament incentives. As has been observed in previous 
studies  of  markets  of  this  kind,  prices  in  baseline  markets  typically  crash  back  toward 
intrinsic value as shares approach the end of their life. However this is not the case for the 
tournament markets. Indeed, in five of these six markets, prices remain above the maximum 
holding value over the final three trading periods. 
The effect of incentives in inexperienced Smith markets can be seen more clearly in the left 
hand panel of Figure 3. Here, the dashed line depicts the average price path for the six 
baseline markets, while the solid line shows the average for the six tournament markets. 
While prices are consistently higher in tournament markets, the two series appear to diverge 
from around period twelve onward. To evaluate the significance of these differences, we 
compute one sided p values for the Fisher Pitman permutation test for independent samples, 
using  the  period  median  transaction  prices  in  each  of  the  markets  as  independent 
observations.
20 The full test results are reported in the first panel of Appendix 2. In Figure 3, 
the background shading is used to illustrate the significance level of the difference in prices 
between incentive conditions according to these tests. It shows that prices in the tournament 
condition are higher with at least marginal significance from period thirteen onward. 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
In the left hand panel of Table 3, we report one sided p values of the independent samples 
permutation test for each of the bubble measures in our inexperienced Smith markets. The 
one sided null hypothesis is that the respective measure is no larger under the tournament. 
Contrary to this, we find that the tournament condition is associated with significantly larger 
Amplitude and Duration. On the other hand, the lack of any significant difference in Bias, 
                                                 
20   This is a more powerful, but computationally demanding, alternative to the Wilcoxon rank sum test; see 
Kaiser (2007) or Siegel and Castellan (1988) for details. The one sided null hypothesis is that the median 
transaction price in period t is no greater under the tournament. Since we perform the test separately for 
each trading period, each market contributes only a single independent observation to each test. 19 
Dispersion and Deviation indicates that, over the full sixteen period life of the inexperienced 
markets, prices are not significantly more distorted under the tournament. Similarly, the lack 
of any significant difference in Earnings Variation suggests that there is not a great deal of 
year to year persistence in relative performance in the inexperienced tournament. 
[Table 3 about here.] 
RESULT  2:  In  experienced  Smith  markets,  prices  are  significantly  more  severely 
distorted under league table incentives. This is the case in all but the very first periods, 
and is reflected in all measures except Turnover. 
The right hand panel of Figure 2 shows that, even in the experienced repetition, pronounced 
price bubbles occur in all six tournament markets, and four of these do not end in a crash. In 
two of the markets, prices rise above the maximum holding value from as early as period 
eight, and remain at those levels for the remainder of the market. Short of irrationality, prices 
at such extreme levels can only be explained by speculation. 
The right hand panel of Figure 3 shows that from period three onward, prices in experienced 
tournament markets are always significantly higher than in experienced baseline markets, at a 
significance level of at least 5% in a one sided independent samples permutation test.
21 The 
results of the corresponding tests for our summary bubble measures are reported in the right 
hand panel of Table 3. For four of these measures, a significance level of 1% is attained, 
notwithstanding the fact that there are only six observations in each incentive condition.  
The  bubble  measures  thus  confirm  that  prices  in  experienced  tournament  markets  are 
significantly further from intrinsic value compared to the experienced baseline. Moreover, in 
contrast to the inexperienced repetition, the tournament is associated with highly significantly 
greater  variation  in  earnings.  The  only  measure  for  which  we  do  not  obtain  at  least  a 
marginally significant effect is Turnover: on average, experienced tournament markets are 
associated with slightly lower Turnover but this difference is not statistically significant.
22 
In summary, we obtain strong  evidence that price bubbles are very significantly inflated 
under league table incentives in experienced Smith markets. This effect is not observed to 
nearly  the  same  extent  in  inexperienced  markets.  We  next  show  that  these  effects  are 
                                                 
21   The full test results are reported in the second panel of Appendix 2. 
22   The one sided null hypothesis that Turnover is no less under tournament is also not rejected, with p = 0.166. 20 
observed for two reasons. Firstly, and consistent with previous research on Smith markets, 
prices track intrinsic value more closely with experience in the baseline. Secondly, in markets 
with league table incentives, prices in fact become more distorted with experience. 
Experience effects in Smith markets 
RESULT 3: In Smith markets with baseline incentives, the effect of experience is to 
cause prices to track significantly closer to intrinsic value through the middle periods of 
the market, as reflected in the Amplitude, Bias, Dispersion and Deviation. 
The  left hand  panel  of  Figure  4  compares  the  average  price  paths  in  the  inexperienced 
(dashed)  and  experienced  (solid)  repetitions  of  the  Smith  baseline  markets.  Whereas  the 
inexperienced markets tend to bubble and crash through the middle periods, the experienced 
markets on average track only slightly above intrinsic value. 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
To formally evaluate the significance of these differences, we compute one sided p values for 
the Fisher Pitman permutation test for paired replicates. This is the single sample analogue to 
the test used in the previous subsection, and provides a more powerful alternative to the 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The full test results are reported in the third panel in Appendix 2, 
and in Figure 4 we use the background shading to illustrate the significance levels of the 
differences according to these tests. The left hand panel of Table 4 reports the corresponding 
tests for our summary bubble measures. In each test, the one sided null hypothesis is that 
prices are no closer to intrinsic value in the experienced repetition. 
[Table 4 about here.] 
Contrary to this hypothesis, Figure 4 shows that the experienced baseline markets track closer 
to intrinsic value with at least marginal significance in periods seven through to thirteen. 
Since prices in Smith markets often start out somewhat below intrinsic value (as can also be 
seen in  Figure 4)  and then crash in the final periods, these middle periods are the ones 
characteristically associated with price bubbles. 
Thus, consistent with a robust finding of previous research, we find that price bubbles are 
significantly diminished with experience in Smith markets under baseline incentives. This is 21 
confirmed in Table 4 with respect to the Amplitude, as well as the three measures of the 
accuracy with which prices track intrinsic value, namely Bias, Dispersion and Deviation.  
RESULT 4: In Smith markets with league table incentives, prices deviate further from 
intrinsic value with experience, as measured by the Amplitude, Bias and Dispersion. 
The right hand panel of Figure 4 compares the average price paths in the inexperienced and 
experienced  repetitions  of  the  Smith  tournament  markets.  In  both  repetitions,  prices  are 
generally above intrinsic value, but in the experienced repetition they are further away in all 
sixteen trading periods. The background shading represents the level of significance of these 
differences in the permutation test for paired replicates, this time under the one sided null 
hypothesis that prices are no further from intrinsic value in the experienced repetition.
23 The 
corresponding tests for our bubble measures are reported in the right hand panel of Table 4. 
Figure  4  indicates  that  the  price  differences  are  at  least  marginally  significant  between 
periods two and ten – indicating that a price bubble “takes off” earlier in the experienced 
tournament – and again in periods fourteen and fifteen. Similarly, Table 4 shows that in 
Smith  tournament  markets,  the  experienced  repetition  is  characterized  by  marginally 
significant increases in Amplitude, Bias, Dispersion and Earnings Variation. 
Thus in the Smith environment, the distortionary effect of league table incentives is powerful 
enough that not only does it overturn the usual tendency for price bubbles to diminish with 
experience, if anything it makes them even worse. We believe we are the first in the literature 
to observe an effect of this nature without changing market parameters between repetitions. 
Results for Noussair markets 
Figures 5 and 6 plot the time paths of median transaction prices in each of the Noussair 
baseline  and  tournament  markets  respectively.  Table  5  reports  bubble  measures  for  each 
market,  along  with  averages  for  each  treatment experience  combination.  Because  we 
collected only four market observations in each of the Noussair baseline and tournament 
conditions, we limit our analysis to a between groups comparison of incentive effects – we 
lack sufficient observations to obtain anything more than marginal significance in within 
group experience comparisons. Nonetheless, our data point strongly to the following result: 
                                                 
23   The full test results are in the fourth panel of Appendix 2. 22 
RESULT 5: In Noussair markets, prices are significantly further from intrinsic value 
under league table incentives, across both market repetitions. This is reflected in all 
bubble measures with the exception of Duration. In particular, prices in experienced 
baseline  markets  settle  almost  precisely  at  intrinsic  value.  By  contrast,  experienced 
tournament markets remain persistently above intrinsic value. 
 [Figures 5 and 6 and Table 5 about here.] 
Figure  5  shows  that  after  some  initial  volatility,  prices  in  each  of  the  Noussair  baseline 
markets settle at intrinsic value by around the tenth period of the first repetition, and remain 
there throughout the entire second repetition. In contrast, Figure 6 shows that prices take 
longer to settle in the Noussair tournament markets, and only one of the four markets ever 
settles at intrinsic value. Each of the tournament markets nonetheless appears to reach an 
“equilibrium”  price  by  around  period  fourteen  of  the  first  repetition,  and  remains  there 
throughout the entire second repetition. However in three of the markets this “equilibrium” 
occurs at a price somewhat above intrinsic value.  
Figure  7  summarizes  the  average  price  paths  for  the  Noussair  baseline  and  tournament 
conditions.  Once  again,  the  background  shading  represents  the  significance  level  of  the 
difference between the two incentive conditions in a given period, in an independent samples 
permutation  test  under  the  one sided  null  hypothesis  that  prices  are  no  higher  under  the 
tournament.
24 It shows that the price differences are at least marginally significant in almost 
every trading period across both market repetitions. 
[Figure 7 and Table 6 about here.] 
Table 6 reports the analysis of our summary bubble measures. In both the inexperienced and 
experienced repetitions, the Turnover, Bias, Dispersion, Deviation and Earnings Variation 
are all greater with at least marginal significance in the tournament condition. In addition, 
there is also a marginally significant effect for Amplitude in inexperienced markets. 
Although the magnitude of the price differences between the two incentive conditions is 
clearly smaller than in the Smith environment – amounting to around five percent of intrinsic 
value in the experienced repetition – it appears that league table incentives can again induce a 
                                                 
24   The full test results are in Appendix 3. 23 
market to “defy gravity”. This occurs even when the participants are experienced, and in a 
setting in which experienced baseline markets price correctly. 
CONCLUSION 
In experimental asset markets, we find that price bubbles can be very significantly inflated 
when traders compete to attract new fund inflows, where the size of these flows is determined 
by their relative performance as measured by short term paper returns. A recent body of 
literature argues that this describes the incentives facing professional fund managers. We find 
that the severity of the effect of league table incentives depends upon the extent to which 
traders face a tension between the pursuit of market and intrinsic values. 
We observe our most pronounced effects in the Smith market environment. This design is 
sometimes criticized on the grounds that its declining value feature is not a fair representation 
of  real world  financial  markets  (Kirchler,  Huber  and  Stöckl  2009).  On  the  contrary,  we 
consider the Smith environment to be a reasonable model of market conditions during a 
period of market turbulence – that is, when investors are reassessing expected future stock 
earnings  in  a  downward  direction  –  pointing,  in  the  limit,  to  the  possibility  of  a  firm’s 
bankruptcy.  In  our  Smith  baseline  condition  we  confirm  that,  with  experience,  market 
participants learn to incorporate such expectations into the price. However, such judgments 
appear to be overruled in the presence of league table incentives, such that market prices are 
able to “defy gravity”, often right through to the bitter end. We consider these to be our 
primary results. 
By contrast, we interpret the Noussair market environment as modeling a situation in which 
market fundamentals are stable, and in which there exists a widely accepted benchmark of 
value. This has previously been shown to be a setting in which price bubbles and crashes are 
less likely to occur. By extending our design to also encompass this environment, we seek to 
examine  whether  league table  incentives  may  be  powerful  enough  to  have  a  discernable 
effect even in a setting in which the intrinsic value ought to be transparently clear. We find 
that this is indeed also the case. 
Our  findings  are  significant  because  of  the  prevalence  of  league table  style  incentives 
(whether  explicit  or  implicit)  throughout  many  sectors  of  the  economy,  because  of  the 
influence that fund managers carry in financial markets, and because of the importance of 
managed  investments  to  the  savings  and  retirement  decisions  of  retail  investors. 24 
Notwithstanding the difficulty posed by the unobservability of intrinsic value in real world 
markets,  our  results  also  challenge  regulators  to  develop  more  reliable  means  to  inform 
investors’ fund allocation decisions – as opposed to merely mandating  the reporting and 
publication of returns information derived from potentially misleading accounting measures.  25 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF DESIGN 
  Smith Environment  Noussair Environment 
Number of baseline markets  6  4 
Number of tournament markets  6  4 
Number of repetitions per market  2  2 
Traders per market  9  9 
Number of trading periods  16  16 
Dividend realizations  0, 8, 28, 60  −24, −16, 4, 36 
Expected dividend per period  24  0 
Redemption value per share  0  400 
Intrinsic value in period 1  384  400 
Initial endowment  2,496 ECU / 8 shares  6,400 ECU / 8 shares 
Intrinsic value of endowment  5,568  9,600 
Initial cash to stock ratio  0.8125  2 
Baseline inflow period 4  816 ECU / 2 shares  1,600 ECU / 2 shares 
Baseline inflow period 8  1,008 ECU / 2 shares  1,600 ECU / 2 shares 
Baseline inflow period 12  1,200 ECU / 2 shares  1,600 ECU / 2 shares 
Baseline inflow period 16  1,392 ECU / 2 shares  1,600 ECU / 2 shares 
Treatment inflow top 3  Double baseline  Double baseline 
Treatment inflow middle 3  Same as baseline  Same as baseline 
Treatment inflow bottom 3  Nil  Nil 
Exchange rate  500 ECU / AUD  800 ECU / AUD 
Average earnings per trader  AUD 45.6  AUD 47.4 28 
TABLE 2: BUBBLE MEASURES IN SMITH MARKETS 











Market 101  1.656  9  2.977  32.750  69.688  2.119  0.224 
Market 102  3.501  12  5.199  34.594  110.656  5.359  0.365 
Market 103  2.458  11  5.479  91.563  96.313  6.666  0.434 
Market 104  8.979  3  6.103  117.781  153.969  11.371  0.699 
Market 105  0.573  1  5.119  2.969  12.156  0.704  0.088 
Market 106  0.326  4  2.723  −18.094  19.219  0.831  0.119 
Average  2.916  6.667  4.600  43.594  77.000  4.508  0.321 
Tournament Inexperienced 
Market 111  9.063  15  5.148  25.125  98.000  5.381  0.390 
Market 112  4.201  10  2.648  48.031  48.031  1.389  0.316 
Market 113  14.411  15  2.414  160.063  160.063  4.011  0.439 
Market 114  7.372  9  5.304  57.219  58.719  2.176  0.430 
Market 115  4.570  8  2.760  66.313  80.688  2.436  0.451 
Market 116  3.047  11  5.149  139.656  145.156  7.227  0.818 
Average  7.111  11.333  3.904  82.734  98.443  3.770  0.474 
Baseline Experienced 
Market 101  0.333  6  2.658  −40.906  40.906  1.193  0.129 
Market 102  0.923  6  2.994  17.438  41.188  1.406  0.186 
Market 103  1.545  10  6.130  85.375  85.875  5.625  0.436 
Market 104  8.802  14  5.894  72.219  97.406  5.864  0.276 
Market 105  0.550  1  4.132  −3.406  3.656  0.247  0.158 
Market 106  0.458  4  3.107  −48.781  48.781  1.630  0.124 
Average  2.102  6.833  4.152  13.656  52.969  2.661  0.218 
Tournament Experienced 
Market 111  47.241  15  5.054  423.094  448.656  20.054  0.793 
Market 112  13.685  14  3.232  172.750  177.625  5.914  0.661 
Market 113  10.828  12  3.286  307.625  307.625  8.994  0.993 
Market 114  11.595  8  2.739  87.844  87.844  2.048  0.521 
Market 115  9.339  11  2.924  76.031  81.531  1.718  0.357 
Market 116  1.659  9  3.588  99.156  102.656  4.295  0.758 
Average  15.724  11.500  3.471  194.417  200.990  7.171  0.680 29 
TABLE 3: INCENTIVE EFFECTS IN SMITH MARKETS 
  Inexperienced  Experienced 











(one sided p value) 
Amplitude  2.916  7.111  0.037**    2.102  15.724  0.002*** 
Duration  6.667  11.333  0.040**    6.833  11.500  0.035**   
Adjusted Turnover  4.600  3.904  0.859        4.152  3.471  0.835       
Average Bias  43.594  82.734  0.114        13.656  194.417  0.002*** 
Average Dispersion  77.000  98.443  0.232        52.969  200.990  0.005*** 
Adjusted Deviation  4.508  3.770  0.637        2.661  7.171  0.066*     
Earnings Variation  0.321  0.474  0.117        0.218  0.680  0.002*** 
TABLE 4: EXPERIENCE EFFECTS IN SMITH MARKETS 
  Baseline  Tournament 











(one sided p value) 
Amplitude  2.916  2.102  0.047**    7.111  15.724  0.094*     
Duration  6.667  6.833  0.563        11.333  11.500  0.500       
Adjusted Turnover  4.600  4.152  0.203        3.904  3.471  0.250       
Average Bias  43.594  13.656  0.016**    82.734  194.417  0.078*     
Average Dispersion  77.000  52.969  0.094*      98.443  200.990  0.078*     
Adjusted Deviation  4.508  2.661  0.047**    3.770  7.171  0.125       
Earnings Variation  0.321  0.218  0.125        0.474  0.680  0.094*     
 30 
TABLE 5: BUBBLE MEASURES IN NOUSSAIR MARKETS 











Market 201  0.298  2  6.056  −13.156  19.406  3.988  0.332 
Market 202  0.100  1  4.233  0.219  4.594  1.211  0.080 
Market 203  0.128  2  3.826  −5.000  5.250  0.861  0.078 
Market 204  0.138  2  3.045  −8.625  9.750  1.864  0.164 
Average  0.166  1.750  4.290  −6.641  9.750  1.981  0.164 
Tournament Inexperienced 
Market 211  0.270  1  4.722  7.000  8.000  2.397  0.352 
Market 212  0.311  1  5.791  96.031  96.031  6.557  0.486 
Market 213  0.596  1  4.806  8.406  31.031  1.932  0.266 
Market 214  0.138  3  12.552  26.875  26.875  4.361  0.578 
Average  0.329  1.500  6.968  34.578  40.484  3.811  0.421 
Baseline Experienced 
Market 201  0.005  1  6.575  0.656  0.656  0.169  0.037 
Market 202  0.015  1  2.796  −0.469  0.781  0.021  0.053 
Market 203  0.005  1  3.320  0.063  0.438  0.350  0.098 
Market 204  0.030  1  2.056  −1.375  1.750  0.044  0.054 
Average  0.014  1.000  3.687  −0.281  0.906  0.146  0.060 
Tournament Experienced 
Market 211  0.005  3  5.219  0.344  0.594  0.082  0.293 
Market 212  0.010  1  4.176  38.969  38.969  1.642  0.184 
Market 213  0.023  1  4.823  17.063  17.063  0.850  0.202 
Market 214  0.065  2  12.461  19.063  19.063  3.226  0.302 
Average  0.026  1.750  6.670  18.859  18.922  1.450  0.245 31 
TABLE 6: INCENTIVE EFFECTS IN NOUSSAIR MARKETS 
  Inexperienced  Experienced 











(one sided p value) 
Amplitude  0.166  0.329  0.086*      0.014  0.026  0.314       
Duration  1.750  1.500  0.814        1.000  1.750  0.214       
Adjusted Turnover  4.290  6.968  0.086*      3.687  6.670  0.100*     
Average Bias  −6.641  34.578  0.014**    −0.281  18.859  0.029**   
Average Dispersion  9.750  40.484  0.043**    0.906  18.922  0.057*     
Adjusted Deviation  1.981  3.811  0.086*      0.146  1.450  0.043**   
Earnings Variation  0.164  0.421  0.029**    0.060  0.245  0.014**   32 
FIGURE 1: PRICE PATHS IN SMITH BASELINE MARKETS 
 
FIGURE 2: PRICE PATHS IN SMITH TOURNAMENT MARKETS 
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FIGURE 3: INCENTIVE EFFECTS IN SMITH MARKETS 
 
FIGURE 4: EXPERIENCE EFFECTS IN SMITH MARKETS 
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FIGURE 5: PRICE PATHS IN NOUSSAIR BASELINE MARKETS 
 
FIGURE 6: PRICE PATHS IN NOUSSAIR TOURNAMENT MARKETS 
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FIGURE 7: INCENTIVE EFFECTS IN NOUSSAIR MARKETS 
 36 
APPENDICES – NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
APPENDIX 1: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SMITH INCENTIVE TREATMENT 
‡ 
General Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making in a market. The instructions are simple and if 
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount of money which 
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
It  is  imperative  that  you  do  not  communicate  with  any  other  participant  while  the  experiment  is  in 
progress. If you communicate with another participant, the data will lose its scientific value and we will 
not be able to pay any of the participants. It is therefore in your common interest to follow this strict ban 
on communication. If you have any questions please raise your hand, and an experimenter will come to 
you and answer your questions in private. 
The main part of the experiment will consist of two rounds of trading periods in which you have the 
opportunity to buy and sell shares in a market. The currency used in this market is “Experimental Currency 
Units” (ECU). All trading will be in terms of ECU. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment 
will be in Australian Dollars. The conversion rate is 500 ECU to 1 Australian Dollar. 
                                                                                                                                                        
How to use the Computerised Market 
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the current trading period. The 
items you can buy and sell in the market are called shares. In the centre of your screen you see the number 
of shares you currently have and the amount of money you have available to buy shares. 
 
You can use the trading screen to participate in the market in one of four ways. 
                                                 
‡   Horizontal rules denote the positions of the page breaks in the original instructions. Instructions for the 
remaining treatments are available upon request. 37 
Making an offer to sell a share, by entering the price at which you would like to sell 
To offer to sell a share, enter the price at which you would like to sell in the box labelled “Enter offer to 
sell” on the left of the screen, then click on the button “Submit offer to sell”. 
The second column from left will show a list of offers to sell, each submitted by a different participant. 
Your own offer will appear in blue. Submitting a new offer will replace your previous one. 
Making an offer to buy a share, by entering the price at which you would like to buy 
To offer to buy a share, enter the price at which you would like to buy in the box labelled “Enter offer to 
buy” on the right of the screen, then click on the button “Submit offer to buy”. 
The second column from right will show a list of offers to buy, each submitted by a different participant. 
Your own offer will appear in blue. Submitting a new offer will replace your previous one. 
Buying a share, by accepting an offer to sell 
You can select an offer to sell in the second column from left by clicking on it. If you click the “Buy” 
button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share at the selected offer to sell price. 
Selling a Share, by accepting an offer to buy 
You can select an offer to buy in the second column from right by clicking on it. If you click the “Sell” 
button at the bottom of this column, you will sell one share at the selected offer to buy price. 
Transaction prices 
When you buy a share your money decreases by the price of the purchase. When you sell a share your 
money increases by the price of the sale. In the middle column, labelled “Transaction prices”, you can see 
a list of the prices at which shares have been bought and sold in the current trading period. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Instructions for the Experiment 
Each market will have nine participants in it. Even though there may be more than nine participants in the 
room today, you will always participate in a market of nine, consisting of yourself and eight others. 
The experiment consists of two rounds and you will be paid your earnings from both rounds. At the start of 
each round, every participant will have a starting balance of 2,496 ECU and 8 shares. 
Each round consists of 16 trading periods. In each period the market will open for three minutes during 
which you can buy and sell shares in exchange for ECU. 
Every share you buy or sell will change your holdings of money and shares. Your holdings will carry over 
from one  trading period to the next within the current round. At the start of the second round, your 
holdings will be reset to the starting values explained above. 
Each trading period represents one market quarter, and thus every four periods represents one market year. 
Since each round runs for 16 periods, this represents four market years. 
Dividends 
Shares are assets with a life of 16 periods. Each share will pay dividends to its current owner at the end of 
each trading period. This dividend will be randomly determined by the computer, and will be the same for 
all shares. In particular, each share that you own at the end of a period: 
•  pays a dividend of 0 ECU with probability 1/4; 
•  pays a dividend of 8 ECU with probability 1/4; 38 
•  pays a dividend of 28 ECU with probability 1/4; and 
•  pays a dividend of 60 ECU with probability 1/4. 
Since each of these outcomes is equally likely, the average dividend is 24 ECU in every period. After the 
final dividend has been paid, all shares will expire and there will be no further earnings possible from them. 
Rank and portfolio value 
Your rank out of nine participants in your market will be calculated at the end of every market year (four 
periods). This is based on your percentage return over the past year. A rank of 1 indicates the highest 
return over the past year. A rank of 2 indicates the second highest return, and so on. Note that your rank is 
based only upon your return over the last year, and not in any previous years. 
The return used to generate your rank will be calculated as follows: 
Return = (Value of Portfolio at end of year) / (Value of Portfolio at start of year) 
The value of your portfolio is calculated as your cash holdings plus the value of your share holdings valued 
at the median traded share price over the last period. 
Inflows of new money and shares 
After every four periods you will receive an inflow of new money and shares. This will depend upon your 
rank. At the end of period 4, the new inflow will consist of: 
1,632 ECU and 4 Shares  if your rank is between 1 and 3 
816 ECU and 2 Shares  if your rank is between 4 and 6 
0 ECU and 0 Shares  if your rank is between 7 and 9 
At the end of period 8, it will consist of: 
2,016 ECU and 4 Shares  if your rank is between 1 and 3 
1,008 ECU and 2 Shares  if your rank is between 4 and 6 
0 ECU and 0 Shares  if your rank is between 7 and 9 
At the end of period 12, you will receive: 
2,400 ECU and 4 Shares  if your rank is between 1 and 3 
1,200 ECU and 2 Shares  if your rank is between 4 and 6 
0 ECU and 0 Shares  if your rank is between 7 and 9 
At the end of period 16, you will receive: 
2,784 ECU and 4 Shares  if your rank is between 1 and 3 
1,392 ECU and 2 Shares  if your rank is between 4 and 6 
0 ECU and 0 Shares  if your rank is between 7 and 9 
The new money and shares are added to your balance after the dividends have accrued for the period just 
completed. That is, you will not receive any dividends on the new shares until the end of the next period. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Summary screen 
At the end of each trading period you will see a summary screen. This will provide information about your 
closing balance of money and shares, as well as the dividend for the period, and the effect of any new 
inflow of money and shares on your holdings where applicable. 39 
Your earnings 
You will be paid for your decisions in both rounds. Your earnings in each round are determined by the 
money you have at the end of the 16th period – after the final dividend, and after the final inflow of new 
money and shares. This amount is: 
The money you had at the beginning of period one 
+ Money you received from sales of shares − Money you spent on purchases of shares 
+ Dividends you received + Money you received in new inflows. 
At the end of the experiment, this amount will be converted into Australian dollars at the rate specified on 
page 1 of the instructions. 
Average holding value table 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE to help you make decisions. 
The  first  column  indicates  the  Ending  Period  of  the  current  round.  The  second  column  indicates  the 
Current  Period  for  which  the  average  holding  value  is  being  calculated.  The  third  column  gives  the 
Number of Holding Periods from the Current Period until the Ending Period. The fourth column gives the 
Average Dividend per Period for each share that you hold. The fifth column gives the Average Holding 
Value per Share that you hold from now until the end of the current round. 
That is, for each share that you hold for the remainder of the current round, you will earn on average the 
amount listed in column five. 






Holding Periods  × Average Dividend 
per Period  =  Average Holding 
Value per Share 
16  1  16    24    384 
16  2  15    24    360 
16  3  14    24    336 
16  4  13    24    312 
16  5  12    24    288 
16  6  11    24    264 
16  7  10    24    240 
16  8  9    24    216 
16  9  8    24    192 
16  10  7    24    168 
16  11  6    24    144 
16  12  5    24    120 
16  13  4    24    96 
16  14  3    24    72 
16  15  2    24    48 
16  16  1    24    24 40 
APPENDIX 2: PERIOD WISE TESTS OF MEDIAN TRANSACTION PRICE DIFFERENCES IN SMITH MARKETS 
Incentive Effects in Inexperienced Smith Markets 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Baseline 
(Treatment average)  258.4  354.1  309.7  328.4  323.4  305.5  308.3  299.7  283.8  278.3  267.9  238.8  160.3  129.8  65.8  49.3 
Tournament 
(Treatment average)  311.9  334.5  336.1  335.0  326.7  322.8  308.8  299.7  297.4  290.4  283.3  283.1  267.5  211.3  200.3  179.0 
Permutation test 
(one sided p value)  0.2424  0.6807  0.1948  0.4210  0.4524  0.2976  0.4968  0.5022  0.3896  0.4091  0.3918  0.2294  0.0422  0.0996  0.0141  0.0227 
Incentive Effects in Experienced Smith Markets 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Baseline 
(Treatment average)  340.7  331.9  315.3  308.8  296.8  286.2  266.1  256.9  225.8  192.5  179.4  139.3  110.5  95.3  80.2  56.9 
Tournament 
(Treatment average)  361.4  366.7  380.3  372.3  387.1  394.8  392.8  401.9  430.1  439.7  425.3  402.5  403.3  422.2  437.7  356.8 
Permutation test 
(one sided p value)  0.2413  0.1104  0.0184  0.0271  0.0292  0.0314  0.0173  0.0238  0.0130  0.0097  0.0119  0.0108  0.0152  0.0119  0.0097  0.0119 
Experience Effects in Smith Baseline Markets 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Inexperienced 
(Treatment average)  258.4  354.1  309.7  328.4  323.4  305.5  308.3  299.7  283.8  278.3  267.9  238.8  160.3  129.8  65.8  49.3 
Experienced 
(Treatment average)  340.7  331.9  315.3  308.8  296.8  286.2  266.1  256.9  225.8  192.5  179.4  139.3  110.5  95.3  80.2  56.9 
Permutation test 
(one sided p value)  0.9375  0.2813  0.5938  0.2969  0.2344  0.2500  0.0938  0.0781  0.0156  0.0156  0.0313  0.0313  0.0625  0.2188  0.9219  0.8594 
Experience Effects in Smith Tournament Markets 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Inexperienced 
(Treatment average)  311.9  334.5  336.1  335.0  326.7  322.8  308.8  299.7  297.4  290.4  283.3  283.1  267.5  211.3  200.3  179.0 
Experienced 
(Treatment average)  361.4  366.7  380.3  372.3  387.1  394.8  392.8  401.9  430.1  439.7  425.3  402.5  403.3  422.2  437.7  356.8 
Permutation test 
(one sided p value)  0.1563  0.0781  0.0156  0.0313  0.0625  0.0781  0.0625  0.0781  0.0938  0.0781  0.1094  0.1719  0.1563  0.0313  0.0313  0.1875 41 
APPENDIX 3: PERIOD WISE TESTS OF MEDIAN TRANSACTION PRICE DIFFERENCES IN NOUSSAIR MARKETS 
Incentive Effects in Inexperienced Noussair Markets 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Baseline 
(Treatment average) 
359.0  372.5  381.3  399.3  384.8  398.8  403.9  402.8  391.3  400.3  398.8  400.4  401.3  399.5  400.8  399.5 
Tournament 
(Treatment average) 
461.3  462.4  456.5  447.8  442.8  444.9  440.0  437.5  436.5  431.0  382.0  430.0  427.5  418.4  419.0  415.9 
Permutation test 
(one sided p value) 
0.0143  0.0143  0.0143  0.0714  0.0143  0.0429  0.1429  0.0571  0.0429  0.0571  0.5571  0.0571  0.0714  0.0429  0.0571  0.0429 
Incentive Effects in Experienced Noussair Markets 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Baseline 
(Treatment average) 
400.3  400.5  400.8  400.0  400.0  399.8  399.8  399.8  400.0  400.3  399.8  400.5  400.3  398.4  399.1  396.5 
Tournament 
(Treatment average) 
421.8  421.5  421.3  420.0  419.3  418.8  418.9  419.0  419.0  418.9  419.3  418.8  418.3  418.0  416.5  412.8 
Permutation test 
(one sided p value) 
0.0714  0.0429  0.0714  0.0286  0.0286  0.0571  0.0571  0.0571  0.0714  0.0429  0.0143  0.0429  0.0571  0.0143  0.0286  0.0571 
 